Justifying Moral Preferences Beyond Natural Facts
In this case, the difference in question is explained by the fact that even though both forms of human activity are based on the facts of human nature (such as compassion and selfishness), the mere existence of a fact does not determine its moral value. According to the statement from the material " link txt", the two kinds of activity, despite originating from the same intuitive sources of human nature, are necessarily evaluated differently: one is seen as normal and something that should be carried out (i.e., oriented towards the good of others), while the other is seen as abnormal because it is directed solely towards personal benefit. The author points out that "if... both activities are equally based on the fundamental facts of human nature, then it is not clear why one of them is considered normal while the other abnormal. The fact itself, or as such, cannot be either better or worse than the other."Thus, the existence of an apparent difference is explained by the need to find a rational, internally compelling foundation that would justify the moral preference for one form of activity over another, rather than simply relying on the empirical facts of human nature.Supporting citation(s):"Indeed, we are presented with two types of human activity. One, namely that which is aimed at the good of others, is recognized as morally good, obligatory, that is, normal; the other, namely that which is aimed exclusively at one's own good, is recognized, on the contrary, as morally bad, undeserving, or abnormal187. ... If, therefore, both activities are equally based on the fundamental facts of human nature, then it is not clear why one of them is normal while the other abnormal. The fact itself, or as such, cannot be either better or worse than the other." (source: link txt)