Contesting the Burden: A Debate on Cultural-Historical Criticism
Smirnov presents several arguments that can be considered persuasive. Firstly, he points out that his main opponent (N. N. Strakhov) does not reproduce and, in fact, does not even mention the principal objections he raised regarding the theory of cultural-historical types. In his view, if the critic does not address the most important points in his article—namely those sections where substantive arguments are presented (detailed by him with page references in the publication)—this in itself undermines the strength of the opponent's critique. He believes that it is precisely these unresolved and unaddressed objections that form the basis for supporting his position.Secondly, Smirnov emphasizes that the critic insists that the existence of these objections must be additionally proven on his part. However, Smirnov confidently states that it is the opponent who should prove the significance of those arguments that he (Smirnov) left unrefuted, rather than him being obliged to further justify his citation of specific pages. Thus, the argument regarding the shifting of the burden of proof onto the critic appears logically justified and persuasive.In summary, Smirnov’s arguments are: firstly, evidence of the critic’s inattentiveness and bias regarding his main objections, confirmed by references to specific pages in his work; secondly, the logical reasoning that it is the critic who is obliged to prove the significance of the rebutted objections. These grounds present his point of view as well-argued and worthy of acceptance.Supporting citation(s):"Dear critic declares that he has refuted all my objections to the theory of cultural-historical types and that all his evidence in defense of this theory remains fully valid. And I, for my part, remain firmly convinced that N. N. Strakhov could not have refuted me for the simple reason that he does not even mention my main objections at all. Of course, only 'attentive and unbiased readers' can resolve such a contradiction, and I can only facilitate their work by pointing out those places in the article 'Russia and Europe' where the most essential objections, not addressed by my esteemed opponent, are located—namely on pages 738, 742–747, and 753 (Vestnik Evropy, April 1888). In a separate edition ('The National Question in Russia', 2nd edition) these pages correspond to the following: 162-164, 169-177, 186, and 187.Then, it would be completely unnecessary to return to what N. N. Strakhov calls his 'evidence.' I deeply regret that our debate has, in part, taken the form of 'personal squabbling,' and I willingly withdraw all the sharpness from my previous response. However, I see no reason to substantially change my opinion regarding the argumentation of the esteemed critic on this issue." (source: link txt, page: 639)"Neither the actual existence of the indicated pages, nor the fact that they contain objections to Danilevsky's theory, nor finally the fact that these objections are left unaddressed in both of Mr. Strakhov's articles, he certainly does not refute. But, in his view, I was supposed to prove that these objections are significant, otherwise my citation of the pages is unfounded. I confess, it is the first time I have heard that a critic, having presented well-known objections to which his opponent has found no response, is obliged afterwards to provide an extra motivated evaluation of these objections, to prove that they are significant. It would seem, on the contrary, that it is the opponent's role to prove that they are 'significant.'And indeed, why is it that N. N.
Strakhov, who has written so much on my account, repeatedly returned to the debate and did not decide to conclude it even after the 'final' response—why does he so diligently bypass these specified 10 pages?Suppose I baselessly assume that the most important objections are located there." (source: link txt, page: 537)